Changes for page Homoiconicity

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	1	+== Definition ==
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1	1	Homoiconicity is the property of a programming language that the code and the data are stored in the same format. For example, the following languages are homoiconics :
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3	3	* ASM : using bytes stored in memory
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	15	+== Triggering embedded code ==
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	17	+In some contexts (like browsers), XSLT code execution can be triggered while a XML document is parsed, via a xsl:stylesheet tag. The executed XSLT code can be stored on the Internet or in the XML document itself (homoiconicity + self-reference trick). A [[blog post>>http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2011/01/harmless-svg-xslt-curiousity.html||rel="__blank"]] by Chris Evans describes a pseudo SVG file triggering a simple RAM DoS . But we can do better ;-)
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	19	+== Simple dynamic SVG images ==
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	21	+We can create XML files which will be interpreted by browsers like perfectly valid self-contained dynamic SVG images. The SVG file is then generated on the fly by the (Turing complete) XSLT engine of the browser. In the following example, the XSLT code will
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	23	+* fingerprint the underlying XSLT engine
	24	+* draw a circle (red if Webkit, green, otherwise)
	25	+* display some properties
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	28	+== Evil SVG images ==
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	30	+Exploitcolor depends of the OS, ...) and exploit a specific vulnerability. This was demonstrated with[[CVE-2011-1774>>http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-1774||rel="__blank" title="CVE-2011-1774"]] and a Webkit exploit tested on Windows, Linux, iOS and webOS.
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	32	+From a security point of view, it is important to audit
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	37	+As the SVG format is valid XML too, t
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	39	+The process is the following :
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	41	+* The source XML file (do not
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